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Abstract 
This paper describes a normative system design 
that incorporates diagnosis, dynamic evolution, 
decision making; and information gathering. A 
single influence diagram demonstrates the 
design's coherence, yet each activity is more 
effectively modeled and evaluated separately. 
Application to offshore oil platforms illustrates 
the design. For this application, the normative 
system is embedded in a real-time expert system. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed great strides in normative 
model evaluation methods that can support more 
sophisticated normative systems. "Normative" herein 
refers to using probability to represent uncertainty and 
expected utility maximization to choose among decision 
alternatives. Evaluation algorithms for influence diagrams 
(decisions, uncertainties, and values) and belief networks 
(uncertainties only) are the computational foundation for a 
new generation of software tools (e.g., DAVID, DA 
Workbench, DEMOS, DPL, ERGO, HUGIN, IDEAL). 
By extending the problem evaluation frontier, these 
software tools facilitate normative system designs that 
address more fully the following features: 
• Large Models 
• Sequential Decisions 
• Asymmetric Model Structure 
• Dynamic Physical System 
This paper describes a normative design that separates 
diagnosis, dynamic evolution, decision making, and 
information gathering to better match problem 
formulation and evaluation with each activity. This 
design is applied to an industrial setting. The normative 
system is embedded in a real-time expert system to create 
a powerful engineering risk management system (ERMS). 
Combining normative and nonnormative technologies 
allows normative power to be used for complex uncertain 
reasoning tasks while relying on traditional approaches 
where a normative perspective offers no substantial 
benefit. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces 
ERMS design. Sections 3 and 4 introduce the Advanced 
Risk Management System (ARMS) project and overview 
normative systems, respectively. Section 5 presents the 
normative system activities with illustrations from the 
ARMS project. Sections 6 and 7 introduce research issues 
and present conclusions. 
2 ENGINEERING RISK 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
Probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) examines low­
probability high-consequence events in complex systems 
(Henley and Kumamoto 1981, US NRC 1975). PRA is 
often performed to validate a proposed engineering system 
design. Engineering risk management determines the 
response to risk for an operating industrial system (Pate­
Cornell1990). Decision analysis (Howard 1966, Howard· 
and Matheson 1981), with its synthesis of alternatives, 
information, and preferences, and its focus on clarity of 
action, is well suited to address engineering risk 
management. Normative systems deliver decision analytic 
assistance rapidly in an operating environment 
Engineering risk management problems exhibit a 
characteristic profile (Figure 1). Following an initiating 
event, the physical system degrades. Warning signal 
thresholds balance false alerts and lead time for response to 
an abnormal situation. Delay between signal and action 
balances system degradation and information gathering. 
Alternative actions balance cost and improvement. The 
profile diverges to represent the effects of different actions. 
Signal Action 
TIME 
SEVERITY 
Figure 1: Engineering Risk Management Profile 
The ERMS design challenge is to identify and characterize 
risk and to recommend a decision-making and information-
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gathering response. Four activities are highlighted, each 
phrased in terms of a simple question: 
Diagnosis: 
Dynamic Evolution: 
Decision Making: 
What is the risk at 
a given time? 
How does the risk 
change over time? 
What is the preferred action 
given the risk and its change 
over time? 
Information Gathering: What information should be 
obtained to refine the preferred 
action? 
Although this paper concentrates on engineering risk 
management, the concepts generalize to other domains 
(e.g., medicine, business). 
Five decision analysis process steps provide a framework 
for this paper's contribution. Formulation creates a model 
that links the principal decision to value. Evaluation 
computes a principal decision recommendation. Aiwraisal 
identifies principal decision model uncertainties with high 
value of perfect information. Reformulation modifies the 
principal decision model to represent the cost and 
reliability of alternatives to gather imperfect information. 
Reevaluation computes an information-gathering and 
principal decision recommendation. 
Normative diagnostic system (Heckerman et al. 1990) 
models are characteristic of the reformulation step. 
Myopic reevaluation is their basic activity. Intelligent 
decision systems (Holtzman 1989) interactively guide a 
user through the formulation, evaluation, and appraisal 
steps. This paper joins an IDS's decision focus with a 
normative diagnostic system's imperfect information 
focus, adds a dynamic physical system model, and 
introduces an algorithm to guide automatically the 
reformulation and reevaluation steps. 
3 ADVANCED RISK MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM PROJECT 
3.1 OVERVIEW 
The Advanced Risk Management System (ARMS) (Besse 
et al. 1992) project's objective is to design and develop a 
proof-of-concept ERMS for offshore oil platform 
operations.1 The project is motivated by the 1988 Piper 
Alpha platform explosion in the North Sea that resulted in 
over 160 deaths (Cullen 1990). 
1The ARMS project is funded primarily by the European 
Community and is coordinated by Bureau Veritas 
Pumping, separation, gas compression, and transport are 
an offshore platform's major functions (Figure 2). A 
hydrocarbon mixture is pumped from the subsea reservoir 
to the platform where it is separated. The oil is pumped 
directly to shore. The gas is compressed and pumped to 
shore. Water is treated and discharged to the sea. 
Water to 
Sea 
Figure 2: Offshore Oil Platform Flow Diagram 
Compared to onshore oil and gas industry facilities (e.g., 
refineries), offshore platforms are relatively simple, 
involving physical separation rather than chemical 
transformation. Offshore platform risk stems primarily 
from compactness and remoteness. Compactness 
contributes to ignition risk following a hydrocarbon leak. 
Remoteness contributes to weather exposure and 
evacuation difficulty. 
The major functions of ARMS are the following: 
• Improve maintenance scheduling 
• Monitor risk levels 
• Detect abnormal situations in a timely manner 
• Respond appropriately to abnormal situations. 
ARMS extends existing deterministic platform safety 
systems whose last resort is an emergency shutdown 
(ESD). An ESD, which can be triggered automatically 
(e.g., by fire alarms) or manually, cuts flow from the 
reservoir, thereby reducing a hydrocarbon leak's 
consequences. 
ARMS provides additional response layers between 
normal operations and an ESD (Table 1). Deterministic 
real-time expert system reasoning continuously monitors 
risk and responds to low-severity abnormal situations. 
Normative system reasoning diagnoses abnormal 
situations from control system information and responds 
to intermediate-severity abnormal situations. 
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Table 1: Risk Management Response Layers 
Qperatin� Starns ReSPOnse 
Nonnal Operations Standard Procedures 
Low-Severity Abnonnal ARMS Deterministic 
Expert System 
lntetmediate-Severity Abnormal ARMS Notmative 
System 
High-Severity Abnotmal Emergency Shutdown 
Maintenance is an ongoing activity in the harsh marine 
environment and often is the root cause of abnormal 
situations such as leaks and ftres (e.g., simultaneous 
welding and gas valve repair in nearby locations). 
ARMS's maintenance scheduling capability assists with 
daily planning. Automation provides platfotm managers 
with regular benefits, thereby motivating them to keep 
ARMS's information current. System recommendations 
are therefore more reliable when an abnormal situation of 
intermediate severity tltreatens or occurs. 
3.2 GAS COMPRESSOR MODULE 
EXAMPLE 
The greatest risk for offshore platforms is a hydrocarbon 
leak that ignites. The most difficult ftre risk is a gas leak, 
which may be invisible and odorless. Two gas leak types 
are considered: progressive leaks start small and grow, 
catastrQphic leaks are complete breaks. Gas detectors, 
process information (e.g., pressure detectors), and workers 
identify leaks. Leak response involves source 
identification and subsequent repair with minimal 
production interruption. Various production shutdown 
levels balance safety and production. 
LD: Gas Level Detector 
PD: Gas Pressure Detector 
Piping 
Figure 3: Gas Compressor Module Layout 
A simplified gas compressor module illustrates the 
problem (Figure 3). Gas enters, flows tltrough two 
parallel compressors, and exits. Pressure detectors (PD) 
monitor internal gas flow and level detectors (LD) monitor 
external released gas. 
After a leak alert, the principal decision is the appropriate 
shutdown level given observations (automatic and human) 
and dynamic leak evolution. Infotmation gathering 
refines the principal decision recommendation. 
4 NORMATIVE SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
An influence diagram (ID) template (Figure 4) integrates 
diagnosis, dynamic evolution, decision making and 
information gathering. The template formalizes the 
engineering risk management tradeoffs implicit in Figure 
1. 
Figure 4: Risk Management Influence Diagram Template 
Diagnosis infers the real physical state (e.g., gas leak 
volume and ignition status) from observations. Given a 
probabilistic diagnosis at a particular time, dynamic 
evolution generates a real-state distribution at decision 
time and at a finite time horizon. The real state may be 
partially observable (e.g., leak ignition). Decision 
making detetmines the appropriate action given the real 
state and other pertinent (e.g., financial) factors. 
Infotmation gathering identifies tests that refine the 
decision-making recommendation. 
Normative Engineering Risk Management Systems 75 
5 NORMATIVE SYSTEM ACTIVITIES 
Although the problem can be formulated and evaluated in 
a single ID, natural independence assertions (discussed in 
subsections) enable each analysis activity to be treated 
with a tailored approach (fable 2). 
Table 2: Activity Models and Evaluation 
Activity � Evaluation 
Diagnosis Belief Network Message-Passing 
Inference 
Dynamic Dynamic Model Dynamic Iteration 
Evolution 
Decision Influence Arrow-Reversal 
Making Diagram Inference 
Information Decision Tree Decision Tree 
Gathering Rollback 
5.1 DIAGNOSIS 
Given observations, probabilistic inference in a belief 
network (BN) generates a distribution over the real state 
(Figure 5). 
Observations 
at time t 
Diagnosis 
Belief 
Network 
Real State 
at time t 
Figure 5: Diagnosis Function 
Given that a compressor module gas leak has not ignited, 
the leak volume is not immediately apparent, and hence 
presents a diagnosis challenge. (If the leak ignites, 
diagnosis on a compact offshore platform is irrelevant.) A 
simple BN infers the leak state from observations (Figure 
6). The Detailed Leak State node contains a distribution 
over leak types (e.g., no leak; progressive or catastrophic 
leak in a compressor or piping section). Given each leak 
type, the observation nodes characterize automatic sensor 
and manual inspection reliability. Component-specific 
leak states are aggregated into three Leak States-none, 
progressive, and catastrophic-for decision-making 
purposes, thereby reducing problem size. 
Observable Automatic Unobservable 
Observable Manual 
Figure 6: Diagnosis Belief Network 
This · BN represents conditional independence of 
observations given leak state. More complex dependence 
structure is possible. The use of simple activity models 
is deliberate to highlight the interaction among activities. 
The diagnosis activity uses the message-passing inference 
method (Pearl 1988, Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter 1988). 
Effective methods exist to compose and construct 
diagnostic models (Heckennan 1990). 
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5.2 DYNAMIC EVOLUTION 
Given a probability distribution over the real state at a 
particular time and a time delay, a dynamic model 
generates a state distribution at a later time (Figure 7). 
Real State 
at time t 
Duration d 
Dynamic Evolution 
Dynamic 
Model 
Real State 
at time t+d 
Figure 7: Dynamic Evolution Function 
For the gas compressor module, a simple Markov model 
represents the leak's dynamic evolution (Figure 8). In 
each time interval, a progressive leak may become 
catastrophic, and either leak type may ignite. Increasing 
shutdown level decreases transition probabilities (p,q,r,s). 
Figure 8: Dynamic Evolution Markov Model 
The model's simplicity and separability are due to 
conditional independence of future leak state given prior 
leak state and a time period. More complicated dynamic 
models (Howard 1971) would increase the system's 
accuracy. Accuracy must be balanced against increased 
computational requirements. 
5. 3 DECISION MAKING 
Given alternatives, information (including diagnosis 
results), and decision maker preferences, ID evaluation 
generates a recommendation (Figure 9). 
Alternatives 
Information 
Preferences 
Decision Making 
Influence 
Diagram 
Decision 
Recommen­
dation 
Figure 9: Decision-Making Function 
For the gas compressor module leak, the principal 
decision is the shutdown level (Figure 10). The more 
extensive the shutdown the lower the ignition risk (with 
its personnel, equipment, future production, and 
environmental losses) and the greater the certain current 
production loss. Safety versus production is the basic 
tradeoff. 
Figure 10: Decision-Making Influence Diagram 
The principal decision is the ERMS's core (Figure 4). 
The diagnosis function provides an initial Leak State 
distribution that the dynamic evolution function projects 
forward to the time of the decision. The Leak State at 
decision time is partially observable in that ignition is 
evident. The Shutdown Level decision determines the 
transition probabilities for each alternative (e.g., slower 
leak evolution for more extensive shutdown). The Leak 
State at a finite horizon is conditional on no ignition at 
decision time and is projected forward by the dynamic 
evolution function. The decision horizon specifies how 
far into the future the analysis extends. 
The appropriate horizon depends on the situation (e.g., the 
leak's severity or the availability of onshore assistance). 
A reasonable approach is to frrst consider a short horizon. 
If analysis recommends full shutdown, then act 
immediately. If not, then consider longer time horizons. 
The decision-making activity uses the arrow-reversal ID 
solution method (Olmsted 1983, Shachter 1986). The 
dynamic evolution activity is a dynamic probabilistic 
function within the ID. Effective methods exist to design 
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and construct decision models (Holtzman 1989, Regan 
1993). 
5.4 INFORMATION GATHERING 
The information-gathering activity uses each previous 
activity and a test alternative knowledge base (KB) to 
generate an information-gathering plan with principal 
decision recommendations that are contingent on test 
results (Figure 11). A decision tree efficiently captures 
sequential information-gathering asymmetries. 
Belief Network 
Dynamic Model 
Influence Diagram 
Test Alternative 
Knowledge Base 
Information Gathering 
Decision 
Tree 
Information 
Recommen­
dation 
Figure 11: Information-Gathering Function 
Other researchers have considered myopic (single test) and 
approximate nonmyopic (multiple tests) information 
gathering (Heckerman et al. 1990, Heckerman et al. 1991, 
Horvitz and Rutledge 1991). My objective is to manage 
the combinatorial complexity of exact nonmyopic 
information gathering by automating incremental problem 
formulation and evaluation. These steps correspond to 
reformulation and reevaluation in the broader decision 
analysis context (Section 2). These broader terms are used 
here. 
Each path in the information-gathering decision tree 
specifies a test and observation sequence. The diagnosis 
function uses observations along a given path to generate 
a real-state distribution. The dynamic evolution function 
converts this distribution into an updated real-state 
distribution at the time of the principal decision. Given 
ignition prior to the decision, the decision-making 
function evaluates the consequences. Given no ignition, 
the dynamic evolution function projects the real state to 
the decision horizon and the decision-making function 
generates a principal decision recommendation. 
The sequential information-gathering algorithm can 
reformulate and then reevaluate or it can interleave the 
tasks. Reformulation followed by reevaluation is 
simplest. The process starts with framing constraints 
(e.g., limits on test sequence length, time, or cost). 
Eligibility criteria in the test alternative KB identify test 
sequences that are consistent with the framing constraints. 
The diagnosis and dynamic evolution functions provide 
conditional probability distributions for test observations 
along each decision tree path. The decision-making 
function generates information-gathering and principal 
decision recommendations. 
Interleaving reformulation and reevaluation is more 
complex but provides useful intermediate results. The 
process starts with a single information alternative (i.e., 
the myopic approach). After reevaluation, the algorithm 
identifies a path to expand, thereby transforming 
nonmyopic information gathering into a search task. The 
process expands the chosen path one step and then iterates. 
Heuristics guide selection of the path to expand. For 
example, the path with the highest expected value could 
be chosen for expansion. In practice, a probabilistic 
strategy that distinguishes between uncertainties and 
decisions is more effective (Regan 1993). 
Computational and judgmental features of the test 
alternative KB are important. First, test alternative 
screening reduces the search tree's breadth, thereby 
pushing back the computational frontier of this inherently 
combinatorial task. Second, experts should be better able 
to specify general test alternative eligibility criteria than 
to specify asymmetric test sequences that are appropriate 
across many decision instances. Eligibility criteria may 
be characterized in terms of the real state (e.g., high 
catastrophic leak probability). If so, the diagnosis and 
dynamic functions are evaluated for each path prior to 
screening. The search-pruning benefits must be balanced 
against the additional computation required. 
The incremental construction of the information-gathering 
decision tree is a flexible algorithm with steady progress 
toward the complete solution (Horvitz 1991). The best 
solution so far is available at any given time. This 
approach is more flexible than a traditional tree rollback 
which requires formulating and solving an entire tree of a 
predefined depth before any results are available. 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
Separating the analysis activities allows tailored 
algorithms to be applied. Recent research that extends 
message-passing inference to decision problems (Shachter 
and Peot 1992) allows efficient diagnosis and decision 
making with a single algorithm. Similarly, asymmetric 
ID modeling (Smith et al. 1993) improves information­
gathering efficiency. 
Even in an ID environment that incorporates recent 
advances, separating activities has two major benefits: 
problem formulation decomposition and model economy. 
Decomposing problem formulation highlights each 
activity's primary feature (Table 3 ). 
Activity separation economizes by obviating the need to 
repeat the entire BN for each diagnosis scenario in a 
comprehensive ID. Instead, a single BN is evaluated under 
many scenarios and the other activities use as appropriate 
the resulting posterior observation and real-state 
distributions. 
78 Regan 
Table 3: Activity Features 
Activity Primazy Feature 
Diagnosis Infonnation Quality 
Dynamic Evolution Time 
Decision Making Value 
Information Gathering Asymmetry 
6 RESEARCH ISSUES 
Nonnative system scaleup to handle a problem of realistic 
complexity presents domain-dependent (e.g., modeling gas 
leak evolution) and general challenges. Most importantly, 
nonmyopic information gathering is exponentially 
complex and is highly dependent on the complexity of the 
diagnosis, dynamic evolution, and decision-making 
models. Application to static decision situations would 
reduce computational complexity. 
Inter�ctive IDS formulation guidance can be combined 
with the ERMS architecture. Starting with fixed 
templates that represent the links between diagnosis and 
decision making (e.g., the Leak State node in Figures 6 
and 10), IDS techniques can guide the user in model 
refinement for a particular decision. 
A good design is necessary but not sufficient for 
successful development of any product, including 
normative systems. Careful attention must be paid to the 
construction tools and procedures for transforming a 
design into a working software system. An efficient 
construction methodology and an associated set of 
software engineering tools are under development for rapid 
development of domain-specific intelligent decision 
applications from a domain-independent core (Regan 
1993). 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper brings together diagnosis-focused and decision­
focused normative systems in a broad framework. 
Removing the dynamic function, simplifying the 
principal decision model, and restricting information 
gathering to the myopic case yields current normative 
diagnostic systems. Removing the dynamic and 
diagnostic functions, and introducing interactive principal 
decision model formulation yields current intelligent 
decision systems. The appropriate balance among the four 
major activities depends on the particular application 
domain. 
The principal conclusions are as follows: 
• A normative system formalizes the dynamic tradeoffs 
characteristic of engineering risk management 
• Diagnosis, dynamic evolution, decision making, and 
information gathering are modeled and evaluated 
separately in a coherent normative system design. 
• Automated incremental problem formulation and 
evaluation manage the combinatorial complexity 
nonmyopic infonnation gathering. 
• The normative system is embedded in a real-time expert 
system to appropriately balance deterministic and 
probabilistic reasoning. 
• This approach can be applied to other domains (e.g., 
medicine, business). 
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